When we hear about the anti-corruption authority in Bulgaria, the public consciousness often conjures images of spectacular arrests and the fight against high-level corruption. Official reports speak of millions in forfeited assets. Ironically, this complex and flawed mechanism, consisting of two commissions – the **CAC (Commission for Anti-Corruption)** and the **CIAF (Commission for Illegal Assets Forfeiture)** – stands in stark contrast to the first anti-corruption law, the ZOPDIPPD (repealed). Although modest in volume, it had clear rules and is behind nearly 95% of all the authority's successes that have withstood judicial scrutiny.
Today, the picture is different. An in-depth analysis reveals that this dual-headed body, led by the same members, either fails to see or deliberately ignores the enormous corruption risk escalated by its own activities. This risk manifests in specific actions and inactions that create benefits for both the individuals under review and for certain law firms, which are awarded huge fees as a result of multi-million BGN claims that are filed and subsequently partially withdrawn at the expense of the state budget.
This analysis examines **three systemic flaws** in the activities of the CAC and CIAF and points out the **three institutional failures** that allow them to exist. This is not mere criticism; it is a dissection of a mechanism that conveniently "turns a blind eye to the plank in its own eye."
Part I: The Evidence – Three Systemic Flaws
How Inaction Wipes Out Millions Through Statutes of Limitation
At the heart of the problem lies a startling arithmetic, visible even in the official annual reports of the anti-corruption authority. The number of investigations initiated by the CIAF drastically differs from the number concluded. Thousands of proceedings remain pending, often for years, in a state of administrative limbo. It must be emphasized that the control over deadlines has always been the exclusive prerogative of the Commission itself and its directors, regardless of the formal separation into the CAC and CIAF. In other words, no delay occurs without their knowledge and consent.
Why does the CAC remain inactive, despite the obvious benefit generated by these actions and inactions?
An analysis of the Commission's public reports reveals a deliberate concealment of the problem's scale. In its 2022 report, the institution lists 2,858 terminated proceedings but omits to specify under which law they were conducted. This is no accident. A significant portion of them fall under repealed laws:
- Law on Forfeiture of Criminally Acquired Property (repealed 2018): Any such investigation concluded in 2022 was overdue by **over 5 years**. In the first half of 2022 alone, their number was 1,824.
- Law on Forfeiture of Property Acquired from Criminal Activity (repealed 2012): Any investigation under this law concluded in 2022 was overdue by **over 11 years**.
An analysis of the reports submitted to the National Assembly leads to the reasonable conclusion that the delay in some of these proceedings not infrequently reaches 7 years, and in the most flagrant cases, a staggering 14 years. For comparison, the statutory deadline for completing an investigation is 9 to 18 months, depending on the procedure under which it was initiated. The total number of overdue investigations during the tenure of this Commission's composition exceeds 4,848, a figure that does not include over 2,000 investigations that are awaiting a final decision, sometimes for years.
This is not just bureaucratic delay. This is a mechanism with a devastating financial effect.
The detrimental effect of delay: The Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture Act (ACIAFA) is categorical in **Article 152(1)** that the state's right to file a claim is extinguished upon the expiration of a 10-year statute of limitations. Any delay by the CIAF beyond the statutory period for investigation can literally "gift" illegally acquired assets to the persons under review.
The 'Short Leash': Audits as a Tool for Control, Not Justice
The second alarming pattern of behavior concerns cases where an "operationally interesting person" – whether for political or economic reasons – becomes the subject of a CIAF investigation. Often, severe security measures are imposed, effectively blocking their entire economic activity, as well as that of their related companies.
And then the investigation stalls. It continues for an unreasonably long time, far beyond legal deadlines, and transforms into a "short leash" that is tightened or loosened not according to the law, but according to the "master's" will. The disciplinary effect is achieved, and the fate of the investigation depends on extra-procedural factors.
In this scenario, a cynical sub-variant is also observed: while the person under review is kept in an economic checkmate, the delay in their investigation allows them to "save" part of their older property through the expiration of the 10-year statute of limitations. Thus, the institution achieves a dual effect – it exercises control while simultaneously creating a hidden benefit.
The "Golden Parachute": How Cases Worth Millions Are Lost to Secure Legal Fees
The third element of this vicious system manifests in the judicial phase – in civil forfeiture cases led by the CIAF. A practice is observed where the Commission deliberately files highly overestimated claims in court, doomed to fail.
The purpose is twofold. On the one hand, activity is reported to the public – "a claim for 5 or even 100 million BGN has been filed." On the other hand, when the case is lost (in whole or in part), this guarantees the award of enormous legal costs for the defendant's defense.
Particularly telling are the cases in which the CIAF itself voluntarily makes a partial withdrawal of its claim during the proceedings. Such a procedural move leads to an immediate award of costs for that part. When it comes to claims worth millions, these costs turn into a so-called "golden parachute" – secure and huge remunerations paid from the state budget. This is a mechanism that simultaneously harms the budget and raises suspicions of pre-arranged outcomes detrimental to the public interest.
Part II: The Institutional Failure
The Paradox of the Investigating Inspectors: Who Watches the Watchmen?
Having established these three systemic practices, the question arises: Who should investigate them? The answer lies with the **"Anti-Corruption" Directorate of the CAC** and its investigating inspectors.
Their legal obligations under **Article 100 and Article 106 of the ACA** and **Article 282 of the Criminal Code (Misconduct in Office)** are unequivocal. Their mandate is to investigate corruption offenses, including misconduct in office, especially when actions or inactions by officials generate benefits and cause damages to the budget.
The systemic, multi-year delay of thousands of investigations by the CIAF, which leads to benefits for the persons under review and causes millions in damages to the state budget, is a textbook example of a factual situation bearing all the hallmarks of misconduct in office.
And what do the CAC's investigating inspectors do? Instead of directing their resources to the biggest leak in their own ship, their public appearances are reduced to pursuing minor or "convenient" cases.
The Irony of Prevention: A Directorate that Ignores Its Own Corruption Risk
The legislator also provided for a structure within the **CAC** to act proactively – the "Corruption Prevention" Directorate. According to **Article 44 of the ACA**, its task is to "analyze and propose measures to limit and prevent any practices that generate a corruption risk."
The described flaws are not secret. They are visible in the Commission's own reports and represent an obvious corruption risk in the institution's functioning. Despite this, the "Prevention" Directorate evidently either fails to see or deliberately ignores this model. Prevention is directed everywhere else, but not inwards, where the problems are deepest.
The "Conflict of Interest" Trap: The Trigger for Removal from Office
At first glance, the **"Public Register" Directorate of the CAC** is merely an administrative structure. In reality, however, it often acts as the trigger mechanism for the entire repressive machine. The establishment of a discrepancy or conflict of interest, no matter how formal, is not the end of the story. It is the beginning.
This is the trigger that initiates a full property investigation by the CIAF, which in turn can lead to seizures, injunctions, and even forfeiture proceedings. Simultaneously, an established conflict of interest is a sure way to be removed from office, often with severe subsequent prohibitions.
The most telling example of this process's absurdity is how the law treats a so-called conflict of interest, even when no benefit can possibly accrue to anyone. Imagine a real-life scenario: a newly-elected mayor in a small town is confronted with a severe "feudal legacy." To ascertain the true financial state of the municipality and amidst a chronic lack of candidates, he hires a trusted expert on a civil contract. The only specialist likely to accept such a task "pro bono" under these conditions is a "related person" as defined by **§1, item 9 of the Transitional and Final Provisions of the ACA**. The agreed-upon remuneration is symbolic or non-existent due to an empty municipal treasury.
In this case, there is no damage to the budget, nor a benefit for the appointed expert. On the contrary, a public problem has been solved. Nevertheless, the law is formal – a conflict of interest exists. Guilt is established, even if the agreed sum is never paid.
This is a classic example of how the exercise of legal powers **serves corruption** by shielding it from a real audit. The assessment of whether a benefit exists, and thus a conflict of interest, is a function of the CAC. Although the decision is subject to judicial review, this allows for the application of double standards and selective justice.
Thus, a formal oversight, often made in the public's interest, becomes a powerful tool for pressure and removal of inconvenient figures, while real corrupt practices leading to millions in damages remain undisturbed.
In other cases, the same individuals are audited multiple times, which creates an opportunity to revise the previous termination of the audits.
Reform Epilogue: Institutional Mimicry and the Erasure of Evidence
On February 4, 2026, through the adoption of amendments to the Anti-Corruption Act, the legal existence of the Commission in its current form was terminated. Regrettably, this did not signal an end to the systemic flaws described above, but rather an attempt at the terminal erasure of tracks.
The functions and personnel of the CAC were mechanically transferred to the National Audit Office and GDBOP without new competitive examinations and with full preservation of ranks. This "transformation" is executed with full technical data compatibility, creating a convenient pretext: during the physical relocation of servers and archives, evidence revealing not just high risk, but systemic corrupt behavior masked as administrative activity, can be effectively neutralized.
This behavior is a function of CIAF, while the oversight and prevention of corruption risks are mandated by job description to the CAC. When the scheme is executed, it manifests in a specific combination of action and inaction:
- By Inaction: Artificial maintenance of investigations until the absolute 10-year statute of limitations expires. When inaction concerns assets worth millions and persists for a decade, it cannot be justified as "ordinary negligence." It is a deliberately provided institutional shield.
- By Action: Filing unreasonably high legal claims, which are subsequently withdrawn by the commission itself. This generates massive legal fees that the state is forced to pay to the opposing party. In the absence of a real trial, these sums become pure "legalized" income, drained directly from the state budget.
Critical Fact: A portion of the former leadership of the CAC/CIAF was pre-appointed to the respective receiving structures. A brief biographical review of the leadership in these agencies demonstrates that, in practice, no personal change has occurred. The system has simply shed its "skin" to preserve its dependencies.
Conclusion
The described flaws and institutional failures are not just isolated incidents but symptoms of a deeply diseased mechanism. It is telling that control is strict and visible externally, while the internal processes leading to millions in damages remain opaque and vulnerable. All this transforms an institution, meant to be the state's spearhead against corruption, into an instrument of personal enrichment, control, and guaranteed financial flows.
Legal Sources
- Act on Counteracting Corruption and on Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Assets (ACIAFA) — Bulgarian legislation
- Art. 100 and Art. 106 of ACA — powers of investigating inspectors
- Art. 282 of the Criminal Code — malfeasance in office
- Art. 152, para. 1 of ACIAFA — 10-year statute of limitations for state forfeiture claims
- CACIAF Annual Reports to the National Assembly